The world of electronics manufacturing has gone through two reset cycles over the past thirty years. The once stalwart Japan, which dictated the rules of the game in the 1990s, gradually lost ground under the pressure of economic crises, a strong yen, and the inability to adapt to the new digital reality. South Korean chaebols such as Samsung and LG reacted to this vacuum with lightning speed, making aggressive investments in DRAM and LCD and recruiting Japanese engineers without any sentimentality. Even the blow of the 1997 Asian financial crisis only served to harden their global grip.
And then China entered the arena: first as a giant workshop for global brands, and now as an independent player with the ambitions of Huawei and Xiaomi and a stake in technological independence. The transition from analogue to digital, from integrated to modular production, changes in economic cycles and national strategies have done their job. Today, the struggle for the future is a match between Korean leaders and Chinese challengers, while Japan has chosen the high-tech component niche. The traffic lights are already flashing: things are about to get even more interesting.
A quick transition
- The rise and fall of Japanese electronics manufacturing (1990s)
- The rise of South Korea: changing the status quo (late 1990s - 2010s)
- The rise of China: the new global workshop and innovator (2000s - 2020s)
- Comparative analysis: country strategies and business models
- Sectoral battlegrounds: tracking the changes
- In dry balance
The rise and fall of Japanese electronics manufacturing (1990s)
In the early 1990s, Japan sat on the throne of global electronics. Akihabara was lit up with the neon logos of Sony, Panasonic and Sharp, and Japanese brands seemed omnipotent: they didn't just sell products, they set standards for the entire industry. Transistor radios, Walkmans, the first mass-produced Toshiba laptops, and JVC VCRs were not just bestsellers, but cultural phenomena. In 1991, Japan exported more than 87% of its VCRs, and companies from the country held the majority of the global semiconductor market.
Go Deeper:
Akihabara is a historic district of Tokyo known as the epicentre of Japanese electronic culture. After the Second World War, it quickly turned into the "City of Electronics", where shops of household appliances, radio components and the latest gadgets were concentrated. In the 1980s and 1990s, Akihabara became a showcase for Japanese technological dominance: Sony, Panasonic, Sharp and other giants advertised their new products here. Over time, the neighbourhood evolved, adding anime, manga, and gaming centres to its identity. Today, Akihabara remains a cult destination for electronics and pop culture fans, although its role as a technological flagship has gradually diminished.
The leadership of Japanese manufacturers ranged from consumer devices to key components: DRAM memory, LCD displays, solar cells - Japanese names were everywhere. In 1989, 6 of the 10 largest semiconductor manufacturers in the world were Japanese. At the peak of its dominance, it seemed impossible to dislodge Japan from the top of the technological hierarchy. But time has shown that even perfectly built empires do not last forever.
The ingredients of success
Japan has built its dominance in electronics on a strong foundation of post-war modernisation. Reforms in education, land reforms, and national unity created an army of skilled workers. Strategic moves such as licensing transistor technology to create Sony's first pocket radio laid the groundwork for future breakthroughs. The main advantage of Japanese companies was the art of manufacturing: Kaizen, lean manufacturing and the Toyota Production System model provided the world with products that combined quality, reliability and ingenious miniaturisation. Examples such as the Walkman and VHS became icons (read more about this in our story of Aiko Morita, co-founder of Sony).
But this armoured casing hid future weaknesses. TheKeiretsu system, a network of interdependent companies, provided stability but also inhibited openness to change. The model of incremental innovation (an approach where companies or countries focus not on creating completely new breakthrough technologies, but on gradually improving existing products or processes) and the focus on perfect hardware looked perfect in the analogue era, but in the digital world of the 1990s, where everything was decided by speed, software and open standards, the Japanese machine began to stall. Stability turned into inertia.
Seeds of decline (late 1990s)
The unshakable dominance of Japanese electronics began to crumble in the 1990s, when internal problems, external pressure, and strategic mistakes simultaneously hit the country. The first blow was the bursting of theasset bubble(from 1986 to 1991, real estate and stock market prices were grossly overvalued), which sent Japan intoa "lost decade" of stagnation. Falling profits, reduced investment in R&D, and massive layoffs severely weakened the corporate sector. Many manufacturers tried to cut costs by moving production to Southeast Asia. And this opened the door: knowledge and technology went to potential competitors like South Korea and Taiwan.
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"The LostDecade is a period of economic stagnation in Japan that began after the collapse of the financial bubble in the early 1990s. The stock market and real estate boom of the 1980s ended in a collapse that paralysed the banking sector, collapsed consumer spending and led to deflation. Instead of a short-term crisis, Japan was mired in a long-term stagnation: GDP barely grew, corporate debt stifled business, and investment in technology declined. Failed reforms and conservatism only exacerbated the problem. In fact, the "decade" stretched for almost two decades, until the 2000s.
External factors only added fuel to the fire. The Plaza Accord agreement of 1985 forced the yen to strengthen sharply, as Japanese goods became too expensive for the world. This was followed by a trade war with the US and the semiconductor agreement in 1986: minimum prices for chips, quotas on foreigners, and strikes on Japan's key positions. The agreement set minimum prices (fair market value) for Japanese chips sold in the US and provided for increased foreign access (from 10% to 20%) to the Japanese semiconductor market. This allowed Intel and Korean newcomers to break through the defences. Internal inertia, an over-reliance on vertical models, and the inability to adapt to the digital revolution finally broke Japan's dominance in the global electronics industry.
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The Plaza Accord is an agreement signed in 1985 between the United States, Japan, West Germany, France and the United Kingdom at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The goal was to reduce the US trade deficit through a controlled devaluation of the dollar. For Japan, the decision had dramatic consequences: the yen appreciated sharply, making Japanese goods more expensive on the global market. In the short term, this hit exports and corporate profits, and in the long term, it became one of the factors behind the "lost decade". The Plaza Accord is often remembered as an external shock that undermined Japan's economic miracle at its peak.
Strategically, Japanese corporations were hopelessly late to the change of epochs. The transition from analogue to digital technology, the growing role of software and modular production chains all turned their old advantages inside out. Vertical integration - when one company controlled everything from the chips to the TV on the shelf - turned from a strength to a liability. The new model created in the US by Windows + Intel (Wintel), with its flexible specialisation and open standards, has proven to be much faster and cheaper.
Japan's nominal GDP per capita has stagnated at around US$40,000 since the 1990s, while other economies have experienced significant growth. Illustration: Вікіпедія
The Japanese have been slow to embrace outsourcing and offshoring, losing out on costs and failing to keep up with supplier innovation. A striking symptom is the "Galapagos syndrome": technically cool but too local products.
Go Deeper:
The "Galapagos Syndrome" is a term that describes how technologies or products develop in isolation from global standards, becoming too specific to the local market. The name comes from the unique evolution of species in the Galapagos Islands. In Japan, this manifested itself in the 1990s and 2000s: companies created advanced but deeply localised products - for example, mobile phones with cameras and mobile internet long before the iPhone, which worked only on Japanese networks. As a result, these technologies were unable to enter the international market, which accelerated the loss of global influence of Japanese electronics.
The result was ruthless: Japan's share of the global semiconductor market fell from over 50% in the late 80s to 28% in the 2000s. In DRAM - from 76% to a meagre 3%. Even in DVD players: from 95% in 1997 to 20% in 2006. The era of Japan's electronic triumph ended before our eyes - and without the right to revenge.
The decline in market share among Japanese manufacturers from 1987 to 2007 in DRAM, DVD, LCD panels and car navigation systems. Illustration: apjjf.org
South Korea's rise: changing the status quo (late 1990s - 2010s)
South Korea's leap into the electronics world did not happen by itself - it was pulled along by family giants known as chaebols. Samsung, LG, and others worked in close tandem with the government, which since the 1960s has been implementing a programme of"managed capitalism": selected companies received cheap loans, tax breaks, direct subsidies, and a protected domestic market. Inspired by Japan'szaibatsu ( large Japanese financial and industrial conglomerates that dominated the economy before World War II, controlling numerous companies through family ownership and vertical integration) and keiretsu (a system of interconnected Japanese companies united around a large bank or trading house, cooperating through cross-shareholdings, long-term business ties and joint strategic planning), Korea went its own way, focusing on exports and creating giants that could compete on the world stage. But with some adaptations - the initial ban on chaebols owning banks and the nationalisation of the financial sector.
This model quickly turned the country into one of the four"Asian Tigers" (along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), but not without risks. The Cebolos accumulated enormous debts - corporate debt ratios exceeded 400% - and became too big to fall without noise. The linkage to the state encouraged corruption, credit bubbles and aggressive expansion without a sober assessment of risks. The vulnerability of this system was exposed to the fullest during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when the entire economic foundation collapsed under the weight of debt and structural distortions.
Go Deeper:
Chaebol is a unique form of large family-corporate groups in South Korea. Chaebols consist of a network of interconnected companies controlled by a single family through a complex ownership structure. They emerged after the Korean War with the active support of the state, which aimed them at exports and rapid industrialisation. Examples: Samsung, Hyundai, LG. Chaebols received preferential loans, subsidies, and access to protected markets. On the one hand, they became the engines of Korea's economic miracle. On the other hand, they created systemic risks: excessive concentration of economic power, debt burdens, and dependence on government support.
Strategic pivots and technological races
Government support provided the initial impetus, but the real breakthrough in South Korea was made by the companies themselves, primarily Samsung and LG. They did not try to win everywhere, like the Japanese. Instead, they focused on key areas: DRAM memory and flat-panel displays (first LCD, then OLED). Samsung entered the DRAM race later than NEC or Hitachi, but it entered hard: it bought the design from Micron, invested more than $500 million annually in new fabs in the early 90s, and entered the investment cycle when Japanese competitors were just winding down due to the crisis. In 1993, Samsung overtook Toshiba to become the leader in DRAM.
The same story happened in displays. Samsung opened an RD centre in Yokohama, luring Japanese engineers amid a downturn in the Japanese FPD industry. Huge investments in research, know-how capture, and a focus on the right technologies allowed the Koreans to not only catch up, but overtake Japan. At the same time, Samsung and LG grew global brands in TVs and smartphones. This was not a banal copy: it was a competent strategy that combined courage, cold calculation and the ability to take advantage of the enemy's weakness at the right time.
The impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was a cold shower for South Korea. Due to short-term debts, weak banking supervision and a domino effect from Southeast Asia, the country fell into a rapid decline: a currency collapse, a stock market crash, and a wave of bankruptcies. The chaebol model - with its debt hypertrophy and backroom management - came apart at the seams: 11 of the 30 largest groups disappeared in two years. Korea received a large-scale aid package from the IMF, but under strict conditions: restructuring, openness, and debt reduction.
For such giants as Samsung and LG, this came as a shock, forcing them to focus sharply on the main thing. They got rid of unnecessary assets, cleaned up their balance sheets and focused on electronics. The devaluation, although painful due to foreign currency debts, simultaneously made Korean exports cheaper and more competitive. While Japanese corporations were stuck in their "lost decades", Korean players were becoming more aggressive, global and efficient. The crisis cleared the field and turned the survivors into the true leaders of the new era.
The Rise of China: A New Global Workshop and Innovator (2000s - 2020s)
In the late 1990s, China began to gain momentum, and in the 21st century, it finally became the world's main electronics factory. This was no accident: the country went all-in, gathering everything it needed for manufacturing dominance - enormous scale, cheap labour, rapid infrastructure construction, and well-established production ecosystems. Companies received more than just workers and factories - they got a full-fledged environment with suppliers, logistics hubs and service companies standing next to the plant, allowing them to move at an incredible speed.
Production centre: scale, cost and ecosystems
At the centre of China's manufacturing miracle is the rise of the EMS (Electronics Manufacturing Services) and ODM (Original Design Manufacturing) giants, with Foxconn being the biggest name. Taiwan's Hon Hai Precision (Foxconn is its trade name) has become the largest contract electronics manufacturer in the world: iPhones, iPads, consoles, laptops - all of these came from its factories. In 2012, Foxconn produced about 40% of all consumer gadgets on the planet. The eCMMS model (full vertical integration from components to logistics) has enabled Chinese brands to focus on design and marketing, leaving the production routine in the hands of the pros.
The result: China has overtaken the US and Europe in terms of production, becoming the largest exporter of IT products - PCs, smartphones, cameras.
In 2023, the Chinese industry generated $4.66 trillion in value added, accounting for 29% of global output. Today, China produces more than a third of the world's consumer electronics.
The key to China's dominance has been the creation of ultra-dense and self-sufficient industrial clusters, especially in the Pearl River Delta region - Shenzhen, Dongguan and other cities. Shenzhen, now called the "Silicon Valley of China", has evolved from a factory floor to a full-fledged RD, design, prototyping and mass production centre. Everything you need to create a gadget - from chips to cases - is an hour's drive away, allowing you to launch products at space speed and with minimal logistics costs.
Yes, China is now losing cheap labour: wages in coastal areas are growing rapidly. But the country is holding its ground thanks to investments in automation, deep infrastructure development, the scale of the domestic market and the unprecedented depth of its supply chain. China leads not only in final assembly but also in component production: for example, more than 70% of the LCD panel market is currently controlled by Chinese factories. This ecosystem effect creates a competitive wall that is harder to break through than simply offering lower wages.
Government catalyst and policy support
The rapid rise of Chinese electronics is not an accidental gift from the market, but the result of cold-blooded government planning. Back in the 1980s, China launched an experiment with special economic zones(SEZs), where everything was set up to attract investment: tax breaks, simplified regulations, preferential tariffs and separate infrastructure. Shenzhen became the star, showing how to stimulate the industry without stifling bureaucracy.
The second big springboard was the accession to the World Trade Organisation(WTO) in 2001. This gave Chinese exporters direct access to global markets and lowered trade barriers. After accession, electronics exports soared, China gained a foothold in global supply chains, and private companies and joint ventures became the main drivers of the boom. Reforms were needed, but the gains were far greater than the compromises.
China did not limit itself to creating free zones and joining the WTO. The state has launched a full arsenal of heavy industrial artillery: massive investments in ports, high-speed railways, highways - all to make logistics work like a Swiss watch. At the same time, we invested in education, vocational training, science and research to create our own talent pool and a basis for innovation.
Special tax breaks for high-tech companies, subsidy programmes, cheap loans, direct funding for technology upgrades through public funds - all of this gradually turned China from a simple factory into a new RD centre. The strategy culminated in the Made in China 2025 programme, which officially declared its ambition to take control of robotics, aerospace, new energy and the next generations of IT. As a percentage of GDP, China spends significantly more on supporting industry than any other major economy - and it is paying off.
From imitation to innovation: local brands and technical leadership
China was once a global workshop for other people's ideas, but now it is actively dictating the rules of the game. The transition from simple assembly to developing its own technologies has become the new normal. This is most evident in the smartphone sector: Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo have rushed into global markets, taking share from Apple and Samsung.
Chinese companies used their huge home market as a training ground: they offered aggressive technology with attractive features at an attractive price, quickly updated their product lines, and sought new business models. They not only assembled devices but also learned: they gradually improved hardware, polished software, and invested in RD. Nowadays, more and more Chinese brands are developing their own technologies, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and moving up the global technology chain.
Huawei has become a vivid symbol of the Chinese breakthrough. Starting out as a telecoms equipment supplier, the brand grew into a global player in the smartphone market until it hit the wall of US sanctions. But even under severe restrictions, Huawei did not give up: the Kirin 9000S processor, made by its own HiSilicon division and produced by the Chinese company SMIC, has stunned the market - a technological breakthrough that many thought impossible in the current environment. Today, Huawei is at the forefront of China's campaign to build a self-sufficient chip manufacturing chain, from design and fabrication to sophisticated chip design software.
Chinese innovation has now captured major technological footholds: 5G, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles (where leadership is no longer only in manufacturing, but also in batteries and processes), displays (China has already overtaken South Korea in OLED panels for smartphones). Companies like BOE and TCL CSOT have invested billions in next-generation displays. The formula for success is obvious: global training + domestic investment + government support = rapid rise from the level of an "assembler" to the role of a technology leader.
Comparative analysis: strategies and business models of countries
The paths of Japan, South Korea and China in electronics are not just different development stories. They are three different approaches to building production, managing innovation, and conquering markets. Each has its own starting conditions, its own strategic stakes and its own business philosophies. A comparison of their models clearly shows that success depends not only on technology or money, but also on how a country is able to adapt to change, manage risks and be proactive.
Japan: focus on integrated hardware
The Japanese giants of the 1980s and 1990s - Sony, Panasonic, Hitachi - built their businesses on vertical integration: they made everything from chips to TV sets themselves. Their strength was in flawless production processes: Kaizen, lean management and fanatical attention to quality. The Keiretsu system complemented the model: close relationships with suppliers, stable financing, and minimal risks.
This scheme worked perfectly for complex analogue devices. But when the world moved into the era of digital, software, and open standards, the old machine began to stall. The vertical model proved to be inflexible, and the focus on the domestic market gave rise to the "Galapagos syndrome" - great technology that no one outside Japan wanted.
South Korea: Rapid transition from follower to leader
South Korean chaebols, led by Samsung and LG, played the fast pursuer game. First, they licensed technologies from Japan, then improved and outperformed the original. Their speciality is incredibly bold and sometimes even risky investments in strategic components: DRAM and LCDs. While competitors were saving money during the crisis, the Koreans were building new factories and buying up Japanese engineers.
Over time, Samsung and LG emerged from the shadows: not only did they become leaders in components, but also built their own global brands in consumer electronics. They retained vertical integration in key areas (memory, displays), but made good use of global supply chains. After the painful but rewarding shock of the 1997 crisis, Korean corporations restarted their operations, focusing on the premium segment and aggressive globalisation.
China: scaling, cost, ecosystem and growth of innovation
China started the game with a different card: huge scale, cheap labour and strong government intervention through special economic zones and subsidies. At the start, the model was simple: contract manufacturing - giants like Foxconn worked as an assembly line for the world, assembling iPhones, laptops and TVs. Foxconn's eCMMS model allowed it to close the entire cycle, from components to logistics.
Gradually, China raised the stakes. Using its huge domestic market and programmes like Made in China 2025, the country began to storm the upper floors of the value chain. Huawei, Xiaomi, and others have entered the arena with rapid innovation, aggressive pricing, and their own digital ecosystems. China's strategy is an accelerated evolution: from a global workshop to a global innovator in just a few decades.
Table Comparison of the three models: Japan - Korea - China
| Country | Strategy | Strengths | Weaknesses | Evolution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | Vertical integration, manufacturing excellence | Quality, reliability, miniaturisation | Inflexibility, focus on the domestic market (Galapagos syndrome) | Leader of the analogue era, failure in the transition to digital |
| South Korea. | "Fast chaser, aggressive investments in key components | DRAM, displays, global brands (Samsung, LG) | High dependence on large corporations (Chaebol), debt crises | Starting with copying, transition to technological leadership |
| China. | First contract manufacturing, now focus on innovation | Scale, speed of production, strong government support | Dependence on global technologies (decreasing), political risks | From the "factory of the world" to global brands and RD centres |
Sectoral battlegrounds: tracking changes
The tectonic shift in the electronics industry's leadership did not unfold overnight - and not in the same way everywhere. Looking deeper into individual sectors - semiconductors, displays, mobile phones, consumer electronics - reveals that each industry had its own rhythm, its own battles, and its own winners. It is here that we can best see how the different strategies of Japan, Korea and China clashed and changed the rules of the game.
Semiconductors (focus on DRAM)
The history of DRAM is a perfect illustration of how giants fall and new predators rise. In the late 1980s, the Japanese - NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi - controlled more than half of the global memory market. This was changed by the US-Japan semiconductor armistice of 1986, which broke the monopoly, and the shift in demand towards PCs, where the Japanese lost.
Samsung and SK Hynix entered the arena. While Japanese corporations were suffocating in their own crisis, Koreans were investing hundreds of millions in new factories and technologies. Already in 1993, Samsung came out on top, and by 1998, South Korea had completely overtaken Japan in DRAM. The Japanese giants exited the market one by one.
Today, Samsung and SK Hynix hold the world's memory in their hands - especially in the fast-growing HBM segment for artificial intelligence. But China is already on the horizon: Huawei, SMIC, YMTC - reinforced by government funding, they are gradually eroding the hegemony, especially in NAND memory and less advanced DRAM developments.
Displays (from LCD to OLED)
The history of displays is another series of great power shifts. The Japanese were the first to shine on the scene: Sharp and other inventors of LCD technology. But the scenario quickly changed. In the late 1990s and early 2000s , Samsung Display and LG Display entered the market aggressively: they invested billions, lured Japanese engineers, and by 2004 knocked Japan off its throne.
However, their leadership did not last long. In the late 2000s, the Chinese entered the game, and they entered hard. BOE and TCL CSOT, backed by billions of dollars in government subsidies, flooded the market with LCD panels. A price war and overflow of warehouses ensued.
As a result, the Japanese were the first to capitulate (JOLED failed and went bankrupt), followed by the Koreans. Samsung Display completely shut down its LCD production, and LG Display sold its Chinese plant to TCL. Today, China holds more than 70% of the global market in LCD panels, and there is no end in sight to this monopoly.
Koreans have long been able to see the storm on the horizon. When it became clear that LCD was turning into a banal commodity product, Samsung Display and LG Display made a strategic pivot towards OLED - panels with self-illuminating pixels with better contrast and flexibility.
LG Display was the first to launch large OLED TVs in 2013, while Samsung focused on compact OLEDs for smartphones. As a result, the Koreans took over the premium segments - from TVs and smartphones to car panels. Today, LG Display holds about 80% of the world's OLED production for TVs.
But the LCD story is repeating itself. Chinese players such as BOE, Visionox, and Tianma are pouring billions into OLED fabs. In smartphones, they have already overtaken Korea in terms of shipments. BOE is building a giant new plant to compete directly with Samsung and LG in large panels.
So far, the Koreans are holding the technological edge, but Chinese pressure is building. And this time, the margin of time is smaller than it seems.
Mobile phones
The history of mobile phones is a classic example of how quickly newcomers can upend hierarchies. The Japanese were the first to add cameras (Sharp) and the Internet to phones before the iPhone, but due to the Galapagos syndrome, their innovations remained a local wonder.
Before the smartphone era , Nokia, Siemens, and Motorola with Sony Ericsson ruled the world. And then in 2007, the iPhone hit the market, and in a few years, only two remained at the top: Apple and Samsung.
But starting in the mid-2010s, everything changed dramatically. The Chinese players - Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo - exploded, first taking over China and then the world. Huawei almost overtook Apple and Samsung before being hit with tough US sanctions. Xiaomi has broken into the top three, and Transsion (with its Tecno, Infinix, iTel brands) is quietly taking over Africa, India, and Latin America.
The market is now completely different: Apple holds the premium, Samsung holds the volume, but both are losing share at the mid-range and budget levels. The smartphone chessboard has become much more fragmented - and this is thanks to the Chinese masters of quick breakthroughs, who now control 2/3 of the global smartphone market.
Structure of the global smartphone market in 2024 by manufacturer. Illustration: Counterpoint
TVs
The TV market has become another striking example of a changing global balance of power. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese brands such as Sony and Panasonic dominated the market, setting the standard with their Trinitron and Viera technologies. However, the industry's shift to flat-panel displays (first LCD, then OLED) opened a window of opportunity for South Korean giants Samsung and LG. Relying on their success in panel manufacturing, strong brands and aggressive global marketing, they became the world's first and second largest TV manufacturers by the 2010s. They gained a foothold in the particularly lucrative premium segment with LG's OLED TVs and Samsung's QLED models.
But history repeated itself: Chinese brands TCL, Hisense and Xiaomi entered the arena. Initially, they captured the mass market for LCD TVs using access to low-cost panels of their own production(TCL CSOT, BOE) and price dumping. From 2022 to 2024, their combined share of the LCD TV segment increased sharply, while Samsung and LG lost ground. Under the pressure from cheap competitors, the Koreans were forced to rely even more heavily on premium products: large diagonals (75" and more), OLED, and the development of their own content platforms.
However, Chinese companies are not stopping - they are actively developing the premium segment, offering Mini LED, large screens and competitive smart platforms for Smart TV. The struggle for the future in the TV market is around innovative display technologies (OLED vs. advanced LCD), diagonals, software and the content ecosystem, where Chinese brands are becoming an increasingly serious threat to Korean leaders.
Bottom line.
The migration of the centre of power in the electronics industry - from Japan to South Korea and from there to China - has become a textbook example of how a combination of technological shifts, economic crises and government strategies are shaping the new world order.
Japan, unable to adapt to the digital age, lost its consumer markets but retained control of critical nodes in the production chain. South Korea grew up in DRAM and displays, but now has to fight for positions under pressure from China's scale. And China - from copying to patents, from assembly to ambitious autonomy in semiconductors - is rapidly changing the rules of the game.
Today, the industry looks like a chessboard where players change strategies in real time. The race is on for AI, chips, EVs, and millions of smart things. It will not be the first to start that will survive, but those who know how to adjust in time without getting lost in the geopolitical serpentine and chain dependencies of the global economy.
For those who want to know more
Co-founder and editor-in-chief of gagadget.com. Graduated from the Journalism Department of Kyiv National University in 1998. I made my first publications in mass media in my school years (there were still newspapers then). Observed the evolution of smartphones in the front row since Nokia 7650 on Symbian. Since 2002 he has specialized in the topic of smartphones, mobile communications and analysis of the development of the consumer electronics market.
